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双重委托代理对上市公司过度投资的影响路径分析——基于异质性双边随机边界模型

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Keywords: 双重委托代理,过度投资,双边随机边界模型,路径分析

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Abstract:

?使用前沿异质性双边随机边界模型测度我国上市公司过度投资程度,运用结构方程路径分析双重委托代理问题对投资过度的作用机制和具体效应。得出:(1)我国上市公司过度投资与投资不足并存,其中,代理成本引致的过度投资使投资支出超出其最优水平的31.4%,占样本的42.8%;(2)管理层持股通过自由现金流、债务、股利支付等不同路径影响公司投资,能有效缓解过度投资,而大股东代理通过自由现金流和债务结构加剧投资过度;(3)双重委托代理对公司投资影响的77.38%是通过自由现金流路径实现的,债务路径的贡献率占21.24%,股利路径表现不显著,未能产生显著的约束功效。

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