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利益冲突下的证券分析师跟进行为研究——基于面板数据的实证研究

, PP. 43-49

Keywords: 利益冲突,分析师跟进行为,机构持股比例,高管持股变动

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Abstract:

?现实中的证券分析师无时无刻不处于证券市场的利益链条之上,这使得其研究的独立性与客观性会受到利益冲突行为的影响。文章在对利益冲突与分析师跟进行为之间关系进行理论分析的基础上,以2008年1月到2010年12月共12个季度的A股市场1171家上市公司的8432个跟进数据为样本,通过构建面板数据的固定效应变截矩模型,进行实证检验。结果表明:机构投资者持股比例越高,即来自内部的利益冲突压力越大,分析师跟进人数越多;而高管持股变动对分析师跟进行为的影响效果不显著。本文的研究不仅丰富了有关分析师跟进的理论研究,而且也为监管部门出台相关政策规范分析师行业的发展提供了新的决策参考。

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