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国有土地拍卖机制研究

, PP. 141-148

Keywords: 机制设计,土地拍卖,贝叶斯均衡,执行,实话实说

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Abstract:

?本文基于贝叶斯均衡上的执行问题,讨论了参与人参数环境空间受机制设计者影响时,不同机制选择的执行条件,给出了目标函数不变时机制对偶等价性的充分必要条件。并比较了中国国有土地拍卖三大机制的效率,给出了土地拍卖机制在实话实说可执行下对的社会福利影响,研究发现:当参与者可以策略性选择行动,实现政府利益最大时,选择限房价或者限地价机制是等价的;非市场机制和市场机制相比,关键还是土地财政和消费者利益之间的权衡;实话实说可执行机制直接显示了政府利益、开发商利润与消费者利益三者之间的权衡关系,但并未改进社会福利。

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