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内生时机下多阶段R&D博弈的均衡行动顺序

, PP. 83-90

Keywords: 内生时机,R&D,外溢,均衡

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Abstract:

?基于内生时机的博弈理论,研究了内生的R&D时机下双寡头企业先进行R&D活动后进行产品市场价格竞争的多阶段动态博弈的均衡R&D顺序,其中产品市场上的需求函数是线性的且企业在产品市场上的行动是同时进行的。运用逆向归纳法研究表明均衡R&D顺序只由企业的R&D外溢水平决定:若两企业的外溢水平都较低(较高),则均衡R&D顺序为两企业同时行动(分别以两企业为领头者的序贯行动);若一个企业的外溢水平较低而另一企业的外溢水平较高,则均衡R&D顺序为以低外溢水平的企业为领头者的序贯行动。在序贯R&D时两企业的R&D总水平、社会总福利水平及产品市场产量(价格)都高于(低于)同时R&D时的情形。

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