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情绪影响下群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型分析

, PP. 162-170

Keywords: 群体性冲突,RDEU博弈模型,情绪函数,纳什均衡

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Abstract:

?考虑到情绪因素对参与者行为的影响,基于等级依赖期望效用理论框架构建了群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型,讨论了不同情绪状态下的博弈纳什均衡的存在性,分析了情绪因素对参与者选择混合策略的行为机理。研究发现:情绪因素对群体性冲突的博弈均衡有着显著的影响,当博弈参与者具有“悲观”情绪时,倾向于"对抗"性的行为,当参与者具有“乐观”情绪时,易于做出“让步”性的行为。在情绪的驱动下,参与者还会受到对方采取某个策略的判断的影响,如当弱势群体认为对手采取“压制”策略的概率低于某个分界点时,随着乐观情绪指数的增大,其选择“对抗”策略的概率将随之增大。最后,以房屋拆迁群体性冲突为例,数值分析了博弈模型的结论。

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