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授权决策的期权特征与模型解析

, PP. 54-62

Keywords: 授权,权力,公司治理,实物期权,委托-代理

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Abstract:

?本文利用实物期权方法对授权决策的核心问题——授权时机和授权对象的选择——进行了研究。首先分析了授权决策的期权特征,对授权决策中存在的实物期权进行了总结;然后构建了授权决策的实物期权模型,分别计算出了授权决策的期权价值和授权时员工对公司的人力资本价值,由此得出了一个可比性的授权决策标准,即临界业绩水平,从而简化了决策指标,提高了信息的利用率,使企业可以对特质各异的候选人进行准确比较,并分三种授权决策情形分别给出了决策方案,最后基于数值算例作出了进一步的解析。

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