全部 标题 作者
关键词 摘要

OALib Journal期刊
ISSN: 2333-9721
费用:99美元

查看量下载量

相关文章

更多...
财贸经济  2015 

规则公平偏好对个体公共物品自愿供给的影响:一项实验研究

, PP. 35-47

Keywords: 规则偏好,社会偏好,公共物品自愿供给,实验

Full-Text   Cite this paper   Add to My Lib

Abstract:

经济学始终关注涉他偏好对公共物品自愿供给的影响,而对于关注过程的规则偏好的研究尚不多见。本文设计了一个带有否决权购买的独裁者实验,通过被试面临两种博弈规则的选择,度量其公平规则偏好。随后根据Fischbacher等的两阶段公共物品实验考察个体社会偏好类型。实验结果表明:(1)被试中约60%的个体持有较显著的公平规则偏好;(2)重复公共物品实验中,公平规则偏好强的个体平均投入水平高于公平规则偏好弱的个体;(3)公平规则偏好程度不同,投入水平受到社会偏好与信念的影响权重不同,行为调整模式有显著差别。

References

[1]  1.汪崇金、聂左玲、岳军: 《个体异质性、预期与公共品自愿供给——来自中国的经济学实验证据》,《财贸经济》2012年第8期。
[2]  2.周业安、连洪泉、陈叶烽、左聪颖、叶航:《社会角色、个体异质性和公共品自愿供给》,《经济研究》2013年第1期。
[3]  3.Abdulkadiroglu, A., & Bagwell, K.,Trust, Reciprocity and Favors in Cooperative Relationships, Proceedings of University of Maryland, Department of Economics, Workshop in Industrial Organization and Microeconomic Theory.2005.
[4]  4.Andreoni, J., Why Free Ride-Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments.Journal of public Economics, Vol.37, No.3, 1988, pp.291-304.
[5]  5.Bolton, G.E., Brandts, J., & Ockenfels, A., Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries.The Economic Journal, Vol.115, No.506, 2005, pp.1054-1076.
[6]  6.Bolton, G.E., & Ockenfels, A., ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition.American Economic Review, Vol.90, No.1, 2000, pp.166-193.
[7]  7.Bowles, S., Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution.Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
[8]  8.Brandts, J., & Schram, A., Cooperation and Noise in Public Goods Experiments: Applying the Contribution Function Approach.Journal of Public Economics, Vol.79, No.2, 2001, pp.399-427.
[9]  9.Carpenter, J.P., Punishing Free-riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods.Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.60, No.1, 2007, pp.31-51.
[10]  10.Camerer, C.F., & Fehr E., Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists.In Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S.et al.(eds.), Human Sociality-Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from 15 Small-Scale Societies, 2004.
[11]  11.Chlaβ, N., Güth, W., & Miettinen, T., Purely Procedural Preferences-Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity.Working Paper, 2010.
[12]  12.Cox, J.C., How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity.Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.46, No.2, 2004, pp.260-281.
[13]  13.Dana, J., Cain, D.M., Dawes, R.M., What You Don't Know Won't Hurt Me: Costly (but Quiet) Exit in Dictator Games.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,Vol.100, No.2, 2006, pp.193-201.
[14]  14.Falk, A., Fehr E., Fischbacher, U., On the Nature of Fair Behavior.Economic Inquiry, Vol.41, No.1, 2003, pp.20-26.
[15]  15.Ferraro, P.J., Vossler, C.A., The Dynamics of Other-Regarding Behavior and Confusion: What's Really Going on in Voluntary Contributions Mechanism Experiments? Georgia State University Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Working Paper, Vol.1, 2005.
[16]  16.Fischbacher, U., z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments.Experimental Economics, Vol.10.No.2,2007,pp.171-178.
[17]  17.Fischbacher, U., & Gchter, S., & Fehr, E., Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment.Economics Letters, Vol.71.No.3, 2001, pp.397-404.
[18]  18.Fischbacher, U., Gchter, S., Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments.American Economic Review, 2010,pp.541-556.
[19]  19.Frey, B.S., Benz, M., Stutzer, A., Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters.Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Vol.160,No.3,2004,pp.377-401.
[20]  20.Goeree, J.K., Holt, C.A., Laury, S.K., Private Costs and Public Benefits: Unraveling the Effects of Altruism and Noisy Behavior.Journal of Public Economics, Vol.83, No.2, 2002, pp.255-276.
[21]  21.Gintis, H.,The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences.Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
[22]  22.Hoffman, E., McCabe, K.A., & Smith, V.L., Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology.Economic Inquiry, Vol.36, No.3, 1998, pp.335-352.
[23]  23.Hoffman, E., McCabe, K.A., & Smith, V.L., Reciprocity in Ultimatum and Dictator Games: An Introduction.Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Vol.1, 2008, pp.411-416.
[24]  24.Karlan, D.S., Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions.American Economic Review, Vol.95, No.5, 2005, pp.1688-1699.
[25]  25.Laury, S.K., Walker, J.M., Williams, A.W., Anonymity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol.27, No.3, 1995, pp.365-380.
[26]  26.Levitt, S.D., & List, J.A., What do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.21, No.2007, pp.153-174.
[27]  27.Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R., Covenants with and Without a Sword: Self-governance Is Possible.American Political Science Review, Vol.86, No.2, 1992, pp.404-417.
[28]  28.Sefton, M., Shupp, R., & Walker, J.M., The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods.Economic Inquiry, Vol.45, No.4, 2007, pp.671-690.
[29]  29.Tyler, T.R., & Blader, S.L., The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior.Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol.7, No.4, 2003, pp.349-361.
[30]  30.Tyler, T.R., & Blader, S.L., Cooperation in Groups: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Behavioral Engagement.New York: Psychology Press, 2013.

Full-Text

Contact Us

service@oalib.com

QQ:3279437679

WhatsApp +8615387084133