Solution monitoring (SM) has been used in a nuclear reprocessing plant as an additional measure to provide assurance that the plant is operated as declared. The inline volume and density monitoring equipment with dip tubes is important for safety and safeguards purposes and is a typical example of safeguards by design (SBD). Recently safety, safeguards, and security by design (3SBD) are proposed to promote an efficient and effective generation of nuclear energy. In 3SBD, proliferation risk assessment has the potential to consider likelihood of the incidence and proliferation risk in safeguards. In this study, risk assessment methodologies for safeguards and security are discussed and several mathematical methods are presented to investigate risk notion applied to intentional acts of facility misuse in an uncertainty environment. Proliferation risk analysis with the Markov model, deterrence effect with the game model, and SBD with fuzzy optimization are shown in feasibility studies to investigate the potential application of the risk and uncertainty analyses in safeguards. It is demonstrated that the SM is an effective measurement system using risk-informed and cost-effective SBD, even though there are inherent difficulties related to the possibility of operator’s falsification. 1. Introduction As a result of greenhouse warming and increased energy demand, a global trend to introduce nuclear power into emerging countries has been a growing and increasing concern from the international society about the consequent impact on safety, safeguards, and security (3S). Introducing 3S mechanisms in an efficient and effective manner will require not only a balance between economic utilization of energy resource and mandatory installment of 3S countermeasures, but also intercooperation between those practices and implementation. The 3S initiative was launched at the Hokkaido Toyako Summit of 2008 by G8 countries [1] and was partly driven by the fact that the emerging nuclear countries are struggling with lack of national legal and technical expertise. The goals of the 3S initiative are to ensure that countries planning to use nuclear energy are supported by strong national programs and to prove to the international audience that the programs are purely peaceful and that nuclear material is properly handled, accounted for, and protected. A systematic approach to enhance the timely, efficient and cost-effective integration of safety objectives, material control and accountability, and physical protection into the overall initial planning phase for a nuclear fuel
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