A new accident causation model is proposed for accident analysis based on the complex network theory. By employing the cascading failure scheme, a new accident investigation method is performed on the associated new model, by which we can reveal key causation factors and key causation factor chains that lead to the final accident. The efficiency of a network is introduced for evaluating the severity of the damage of the whole network and hence the severity of the accident if it happens. All these can provide the government or associations with recommendations for accident prediction and prevention. 1. Introduction Accident causation models are tools to describe scenarios for accident occurrences, explain possible causation mechanisms of accidents, provide conceptual or theoretical basis for accident investigation methods, and hence give evidence to formulate specific recommendations for accident prevention. As a fundamental but essential task of accident analysis, the modelling of accident causation mechanisms has concentrated great interests of researchers and engineers in many fields, especially in those high-risk industries such as aviation, nuclear plants, and railway system. As Svenson [1] has stated that “an accident can be explained in different ways depending on the accident analysis model that is used,” different models focus of different aspects on the accident occurrences and provide different recommendations for improving measurements. To get a clear understanding of the accidents, a number of different accident causation models have been proposed, which can be roughly divided into three major groups according to Hollnagel’s classification [2]. The first group, also the earliest one, is termed as the “sequential accident model” [3], with the well-known Domino theory [4] as a typical example. In this group of models, accidents are regarded as a one-dimensional sequence of events that happened in a specific order. The second group is called the “epidemiological accident model” [5], in which accidents are regarded as analog to the spreading of epidemiological diseases, with the Swiss Cheese model [6, 7] as a major contribution to this group. The third group, also known as the most modern one, is the “systemic accident model” (e.g., see [8–11]), in which accident processes are described as a complex and interconnected network of events rather than a simple cause-effect chain of events as in the first two groups. Rasmussen’s [11] risk management model and Leveson’s [10] STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) model are two notable
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