全部 标题 作者
关键词 摘要

OALib Journal期刊
ISSN: 2333-9721
费用:99美元

查看量下载量

相关文章

更多...
PLOS ONE  2014 

Naturalizing Sense of Agency with a Hierarchical Event-Control Approach

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0092431

Full-Text   Cite this paper   Add to My Lib

Abstract:

Unraveling the mechanisms underlying self and agency has been a difficult scientific problem. We argue for an event-control approach for naturalizing the sense of agency by focusing on the role of perception-action regularities present at different hierarchical levels and contributing to the sense of self as an agent. The amount of control at different levels of the control hierarchy determines the sense of agency. The current study investigates this approach in a set of two experiments using a scenario containing multiple agents sharing a common goal where one of the agents is partially controlled by the participant. The participant competed with other agents for achieving the goal and subsequently answered questions on identification (which agent was controlled by the participant), the degree to which they are confident about their identification (sense of identification) and the degree to which the participant believed he/she had control over his/her actions (sense of authorship). Results indicate a hierarchical relationship between goal-level control (higher level) and perceptual-motor control (lower level) for sense of agency. Sense of identification ratings increased with perceptual-motor control when the goal was not completed but did not vary with perceptual-motor control when the goal was completed. Sense of authorship showed a similar interaction effect only in experiment 2 that had only one competing agent unlike the larger number of competing agents in experiment 1. The effect of hierarchical control can also be seen in the misidentification pattern and misidentification was greater with the agent affording greater control. Results from the two studies support the event-control approach in understanding sense of agency as grounded in control. The study also offers a novel paradigm for empirically studying sense of agency and self.

References

[1]  Pacherie E (2011) Self-agency. In: Gallagher S, editor. Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 442–464.
[2]  Metzinger T (2005) Precis: Being no one. Psyche 11: 1–31.
[3]  Blackmore S (2004) Consciousness: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.
[4]  Dennett D (1992) The self as the center of narrative gravity. In: Kessel F,Cole P, Johnson D,editors. Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 275–288.
[5]  Hood BM (2012) The Self Illusion: How the Social Brain Creates Identity. New York: Oxford University Press.
[6]  Wegner DM (2005) Who is controller of controlled processes? In: Hassin RR, Uleman JS, editors, The New Unconscious. New York: Oxford University press. pp. 19–36.
[7]  Wegner DM (2008) Self is magic. In: Baer J, Kaufman JC, Baumeister RS, editors. Are we Free? Psychology and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 226–247.
[8]  Gallagher S (2000) Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends Cogn Sci 1: 14–21. doi: 10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5
[9]  Ebert JP, Wegner DM (2010) Time warp: Authorship shapes the perceived timing of actions and events. Conscious Cogn 19: 481–489. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.10.002
[10]  Jeannerdo M, Pacherie E (2004) Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind Lang 19: 113–146. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00251.x
[11]  Kumar D, Srinivasan N (2013) Hierarchical control and sense of agency: Differential effects of control on implicit and explicit measures of agency. Proc 35th Annu Conf Cogn Sci Soc, Berlin, Germany.
[12]  Hommel B, Musseler J, Aschersleben G, Prinz W (2001) The theory of event coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning. Behav Brain Sci 24: 849–878. doi: 10.1017/s0140525x01000103
[13]  Jordan JS (2003) Emergence of self and other in perception and action: An event-control approach. Conscious Cogn 4: 633–646. doi: 10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00075-8
[14]  Jordan JS, Hershberger WA (1989) The behavioral illusion: Misperception of volitional action. In: Hershberger, W.A., editor. Volitional Action. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., North-Holland. pp. 371–386.
[15]  Mansell W (2011) Control of perception should be operationalized as a fundamental property of the nervous system. Top Cogn Sci 3: 257–261. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01140.x
[16]  Hommel B (2007) Consciousness and control, not identical twins. J Conscious Studies 14: 155–176.
[17]  Powers WT (2005) Behavior: The Control of Perception, Second edition, New Canaan Connecticut, USA: Benchmark Publications.
[18]  Friston K (2009) The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain? Trends Cogn Sci 13: 293–301. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005
[19]  Hommel B (2010) Grounding attention in action control: The intentional control of selection. In: Bruya BJ, editor, Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 121–140.
[20]  Apps MAJ, Tsakiris M (2013) The free-energy self: A predictive coding account of self-recognition. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.20?13.01.029.
[21]  Synofzik M, Thier P, Leube DK, Scholotterbeck P, Linder A (2010) Misattributions of agency in schizophrenia are based on imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences. Brain 133: 262–271. doi: 10.1093/brain/awp291
[22]  Frith C (2005) The self in action: Lessons from delusion of control. Conscious Cogn 14: 752–770. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.002
[23]  Miall RC, Wolpert DM (1996) Forward models for physiological motor control. Neural Netw 9: 1265–1279. doi: 10.1016/s0893-6080(96)00035-4
[24]  Ichikawa M, Masakura Y (2006) Manual control of the visual stimulus reduces the flash-lag effect. Vision Res 46: 2192–2203. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2005.12.021
[25]  Moore JW, Lagando D, Deal DC, Haggard P (2009) Feeling of control: Contingency determines experience of self. Cogn 110: 279–283. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.11.006
[26]  Schneider DW, Logan GD (2007) Hierarchical control of cognitive processes: Switching task in sequences. J Exp Psychol Gen 135: 623–640.
[27]  Moore JW, Obhi SS (2012) Intentional Binding and sense of agency: A review. Conscious Cogn 21: 1211–1220. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002
[28]  Haggard P, Clark S (2003) Intentional action: Conscious action and neural prediction, Conscious Cogn. 12: 695–707. doi: 10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00052-7
[29]  Desantis A, Cedric R, Waszack F (2011) On the infuence of causal beliefs on feeling of agency. Conscious Cogn 20: 1211–1220. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.012
[30]  Dewey JA, Seiffert AE, Carr TH (2010) Taking credit for success: The phenomenology of control in a goal directed task. Conscious Cogn 19: 48–62. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.09.007
[31]  Gao T, Newman GE, Scholl BJ (2009) The psychophysics of chasing: A case study in perception of animacy. Cogn Psychol 59(2): 154–179. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2009.03.001
[32]  Cohen J, Cohen P, West SG, Aiken LS (1983). Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (3rd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
[33]  Honaker J, King G, Blackwell M (2009) AMELIA II: A Program for Missing Data. Copy at http://j.mp/k4t8Ej
[34]  Clark A (2013) Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents and the future of cognitive science. . Behav Brain Sci. 36(3): 181–204. doi: 10.1017/s0140525x12000477
[35]  Hurley S (2008) The shared circuit model (SCM): how control, mirroring, and simulation can enable imitation, deliberation, and mindreading. Behav Brain Sci 31: 1–22. doi: 10.1017/s0140525x07003123
[36]  Hommel B (2013) Ideomotor action control: On the perceptual grounding of voluntary actions and agents. In: Prinz W, Beisert M, Herwig A, editors, Action Science: Foundations of an Emerging Discipline. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 113–136.
[37]  Marken RS (1986) Perceptual organization of behavior: A hierarchical control model of coordinated action. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 12: 267–276. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.12.3.267
[38]  Seth AK, Suzuki K (2012) Critchley HD (2012) An interoceptive predicting coding model of conscious presence. Front Psychol 2: 395. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00395
[39]  Feinberg TE (2011) The nested neural hierarchy and the self. Conscious Cogn 20: 4–15. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.016
[40]  Pacherie E (2007) The sense of control and the sense of agency. . Psyche. 13: 1–30. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199988341.003.0020
[41]  Limanowski J, Blankenburg F (2013) Minimal self-models and the free energy principle. Front Hum Neurosci 7: 547. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547
[42]  Hohwy J (2007) The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception. Psyche 13(1).
[43]  Badre D, Hoffman J, Cooney JW (2009) D’Esposito (2009) Hierarchical cognitive control deficits following damage to the human frontal lovbe. Nature Neurosci 12: 515–522. doi: 10.1038/nn.2277

Full-Text

Contact Us

service@oalib.com

QQ:3279437679

WhatsApp +8615387084133