Anthropomorphism and Evidence

The psychological literature today is awash in ungrounded concepts and methods. Although our more sophisticated colleagues are careful to operationalize their concepts (e.g., fear), others use the same concepts with reckless abandon, constructing conceptual edifices on the weakest of foundations. For such theorists, it sometimes seems that evidence has become an inconvenience. One can almost hear them exclaiming: "Evidence be damned. We have minds to explore!" Given this current intellectual climate, it is not surprising that anthropomorphism is popular once again. Along with its fellow travelers—mentalism, introspection, and anecdotalism—anthropomorphism has infected the animal behavior literature in the same way that nativism has infected developmental psychology (Blumberg, 2005). I admire Clive Wynne for his stubborn passion in this struggle. But as I read his astute and perceptive essay—and it should be said that I read it as someone who did not need to be convinced—I found myself aching to change the ground rules of the debate. In particular, I believe it is time to begin demanding that some meat be placed on the anthropomorphism bones. To that end, I would like to see the proponents of anthropomorphism answer some basic questions.