Husserl and the Fact of Practical Reason – Phenomenological Claims toward a Philosophical Ethics Husserlis ir praktinio proto faktas –fenomenologin s pretenzijos filosofin etik

The thesis of this paper is that Husserl, in his later ethics, reinterprets the philosophical content that discloses itself in the Kantian conception of a “fact of practical reason”. From 1917/18 on, Husserl increasingly ceases to pursue his initial idea of a scientific ethics. The reason for this move lies precisely in the phenomenological analysis of “Gemütsakte”, through which two main features of the fact of practical reason impose themselves more and more on Husserls thought: the personal concernment/obligation and the primacy of the practical with the coeval call for universal validity. Husserl recognizes that the form of ethical facticity or entanglement cannot be grasped by a science of evidence, which speaks objectively and non-personally (apersonal) of acts of willing, valuing or preferring. Husserl thus gets to a reinterpretation of the fact of practical reason as the philosophical nucleus of his ethics, which is now a personal and affective ethics. He bestows a texture on this fact, however not as he would have thought in the first place: not as evident laws of a material apriori of “Gemüt”. In the person and her ethical experience as absolute affection Husserl rather discovers that which is per se not objectifiable and not to be made rationally evident. By this, Husserl captures and phenomenologically explains the non-objectifiable source of obligation and the possibility of complying with it. Article in English Teigiama, kad savo v lyvojoje etikoje Husserlis reinterpretuoja tok filosofin turin , kuris geriausiai gali būti suprastas kanti kosios praktinio proto fakto“ sampratos viesoje. Nuo pat 1917–1918 met Husserlis vis ma iau d mesio skyr pirminei mokslin s etikos id jai gyvendinti. To prie astis glūdi Gemütsakte analiz je, po kurios net keli pagrindiniai praktinio proto fakto teorijos bruo ai pama u sismelk Husserlio m stym : tai asmeninis rūpestis (prievol ) ir praktikos pirmumo i k limas, einantis kartu su universalaus pagr stumo siekiu. Husserlis pripa sta, kad etinis fakti kumas negali būti deramai suvoktas mokslo, paremto rodymais, kalban io objektyviai ir be-asmeni kai apie tro kim , vertinimo ar pasirinkimo aktus. Tod l Husserlis pereina prie praktinio proto fakto kaip naujo filosofinio jo etikos branduolio reinterpretacijos, kartu pereidamas prie asmenin s, afektyvumu apibūdinamos etikos. Kitaip nei anks iau, Husserlis traktuoja praktinio proto fakt ne kaip akivaizd ius materialaus Gemüt priorinius d snius. Asmenyje ir jo etin je patirtyje kaip absoliu ioje afekcijoje Husserlis aptinka ka k per se neobjektyvuoja