Husserl and Kant on Pers nlichkeit Husserlis ir Kantas apie Pers nlichkeit

This paper pursues a Kantian critique of Husserl’s theory of moral consciousness as it is found in his lectures on ethics and other shorter pieces on political and moral philosophy from the interwar period. The critique centers on Kant’s conception of moral personality (Pers nlichkeit), arguing that Husserl fails to appreciate the force of this idea, subsequently leaving himself open to the charge of moral perfectionism. The paper ends with a positive assessment of Husserl’s thought, however, arguing that Husserl provides important resources for understanding moral consciousness as a sensibility for the possible, adding an important dimension to approaches in ethics that tend to center exclusively on questions of motivation and principle. Article in English Straipsnyje kritikuojama Husserlio tarpukario moralin s s mon s teorijos, suformuluotos etikos paskaitose ir kituose trumpesniuose politin s bei moral s filosofijos tekstuose i kanti kosios kritikos, perspektyvos. Kritika remiasi Kanto moralinio asmeni kumo (Pers nlichkeit) samprata ir teigiama, kad Husserlis deramai ne vertina ios id jos, kartu leid ia save kaltinti moraliniu perfekcionizmu. Nepaisant to, straipsnio pabaigoje teigiamai vertinamos Husserlio id jos ir teigiama, kad Husserlis suformuluoja reik mingas prielaidas moralinei s monei, kaip jautrumo galimybei“ (sensibility for the possible), suvokti, taip priduria nauj dimensij prie toki etikos perspektyv , kurios susitelkia i imtinai ties motyvacijos ir princip klausimais. Straipsnis angl kalba