The Waterfilling Game-Theoretical Framework for Distributed Wireless Network Information Flow

We present a general game-theoretical framework for power allocation in the downlink of distributed wireless small-cell networks, where multiple access points (APs) or small base stations send independent coded network information to multiple mobile terminals (MTs) through orthogonal channels. In such a game-theoretical study, a central question is whether a Nash equilibrium (NE) exists, and if so, whether the network operates efficiently at the NE. For independent continuous fading channels, we prove that the probability of a unique NE existing in the game is equal to 1. Furthermore, we show that this power allocation problem can be studied as a potential game, and hence efficiently solved. In order to reach the NE, we propose a distributed waterfilling-based algorithm requiring very limited feedback. The convergence behavior of the proposed algorithm is discussed. Finally, numerical results are provided to investigate the price of anarchy or inefficiency of the NE.