The Paradox of Federal Bicameralism

Although still regarded by many as an essential feature of a truly federal government, the institution of the federal chamber appears to be experiencing a deep crisis. In all but two cases, in fact, federal chambers have shown over the decades an uncontrollable tendency towards centralization, to the limit that they now seem indistinguishable from regular, national chambers. The article assesses this problem from three perspectives. 1. A theoretical analysis of the concept of regional representation reveals that the origins of such a crisis lie in an intrinsic flaw of the institutional model upon which the chambers are based. 2. An historical analysis of the birth of federal chambers, and particularly of their archetype, the US Senate, shows that such a flaw is due to the misinterpretation of two features of the latter – equal representation and indirect election – which have been regarded as serving to provide true regional representatives, when their original rationale was in fact the protection from the risk of factionalism. 3. Finally, an analysis of the impact of political parties on federalism and on federal chambers shows that a possible solution for their crisis lies in using them as instruments for the decentralization and destructurization of the party system.