Radykalna interpretacja intencjonalno ci w filozofii Martina Heideggera (Radical interpretation of intentionality in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy)

The aim of this paper is to present Martin Heidegger’s view on intentionality. We start from initial observations on the phenomenon of intentionality (here we refer to four possible concepts of intentionality: mentalistic, linguistic, pragmatic, and naturalistic) and a few remarks on the fundamental ontology of Heidegger. Then we show what intentionality is not for Heidegger: fi rst, it is not an objectively existing relationship between two entities and, secondly, intentionality is not the subjectivity of the subject; and we specify what intentionality is: in Heidegger’s ontology, intentionality is closely related to the transcendence of being-in-the-world. Transcending – the constancy in crossing – Dasein enables it to refer to itself, other conscious beings, and, in general, all present entities. We have shown that none of the above concepts of intentionality (mentalistic, linguistic, pragmatic, and naturalistic) is not congruent with the interpretation of Heidegger, which concentrates on the following issue: how to go beyond the traditional understanding of intentionality and reach a more basic form of experience.