Non-Alethic Meinongian Logic

The purpose of this work is to provide an answer to two fundamental questions: 1) Can a non-alethic logic be a Meinongian logic? And consequently 2) Can a non-alethic logic be an adequate logic for a Meinongian theory of objects? Using the results of da Costa (1989) and da Costa & Marconi (1986) and furthermore of da Costa (1986 and 1993) I propose a minimal non-alethic logic of the first order with identity and Hilbert’s "-symbol (da Costa et al. 1992) which can bring into Meinongian spirit the most relevant aspects of Meinongian logic underlying Meinong’s theory of objects. This is just a first approach of mine, to account for a complex thought, but so interesting, too as Meinong’s thought. Furthermore, giving a positive answer to 1) and 2) I indicate a plausible way which can avoid both difficult approaches and the attempt to refuse the theory of objects in order to do not compromise standard logic and some of its own laws. My approach shows that Meinong’s theory can be a valid ontology, because there is adequate and not banal logic underlying it.