Metaphor, skepticism, understanding Metaphor, skepticism, understanding

This paper examines the idea that metaphor is a basic cognitive tool from a Wittgensteinian point of view. One specific aspect of Wittgenstein’s legacy is explored, namely his account of verbal understanding. Two interconnected and notoriously difficult features of this account are highlighted and discussed: the idea that linguistic understanding is not an event or a process, but an “abiding condition” (Philosophical Investigations, §143-84); and the idea that neither the meaning of a linguistic expression nor our understanding of it can ever go beyond our capacity of explaining it (Philosophical Investigations, §75). This perspective is shown to be particularly apt in reflecting upon the virtues of metaphor as a means of understanding, especially because it allows for the avoidance of both essentialist and skeptical accounts. This paper examines the idea that metaphor is a basic cognitive tool from a Wittgensteinian point of view. One specific aspect of Wittgenstein’s legacy is explored, namely his account of verbal understanding. Two interconnected and notoriously difficult features of this account are highlighted and discussed: the idea that linguistic understanding is not an event or a process, but an “abiding condition” (Philosophical Investigations, §143-84); and the idea that neither the meaning of a linguistic expression nor our understanding of it can ever go beyond our capacity of explaining it (Philosophical Investigations, §75). This perspective is shown to be particularly apt in reflecting upon the virtues of metaphor as a means of understanding, especially because it allows for the avoidance of both essentialist and skeptical accounts.