Wieviel Logik braucht die Semantik? Ein Problem (nicht nur) für die wahrheitstheoretische Semantik

The present paper is a closer examination of that version of so-called "truth-theoretic semantics" which is developed by Larson and Segal (1995). Generally, the claim of truth-functional semantics is that the semantic meta-theory of an object language is exhausted by an adequate theory of truth for this language. Here the measure of adequacy is Tarski's celebrated "criterion T", which requires for each object language sentence A a sentence (of a special form) stating the truth-conditions for A. Larson and Segal combine the truth-theoretic view on semantics with a modular approach to linguistics. They stipulate a semantic module in which the truth-conditions for the object language sentences are derived. Since the "logic module" is, according to Larson and Segal, separated from the semantic module, these derivations can only make quite limited use of logical means. In the present paper I shall demonstrate that even in one of the most primitive sample theories which Larson and Segal develop in their monography, it is necessary to use much more of logic than they are ready to admit. Finally, I will set up and comment on a general formulation of the problem involved here, namely: how much logic is necessary in an adequate semantics.