The why of consciousness, theoretical gap and a double-aspect theory

In the first part of this paper I will outline the debate in philosophy of mind between those who, to borrow from Chalmers (Chalmers 1996) recognize the existence of the hard problem of consciousness and between those who do not. I will call the two groups non-reductivists and reductivists, respectively. The second part will put forward a specific type of criticism against reductivists - in short that its proponents incorrectly assume the resolution of another dispute, the one between the so-called pessimistic and optimistic inductivists. It will be claimed that such an assumption should not be made, and that until the latter debate is settled, or at least until a specific solution is offered within the context of the philosophy of mind, we have every right to be skeptical towards reductivist attempts. In the third part of the paper I will propose a possible solution which might offer some hope of finding the middle ground between the two sides.