The semantics of indicative conditionals: A counterexample to the horseshoe analysis

The paper examines a counterexample of the horseshoe analysis of indicative conditionals (according to which indicative conditionals “→” have the same truth-conditions as the material implication “?”). The example is a modified and improved version of Jason Decker’s “playground conditionals” case. The paper aims to show why Decker’s original example is wrong, and how it can be improved by using the inverted spectrum thought experiment. It is also shown in this paper that playground conditionals do not pose any problems to the epistemic version of the two-dimensional semantics (E2-D), which leads to the conclusion that we should prefer E2-D to the horseshoe analysis of indicative conditionals. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179067: Logi ko-epistemolo ki osnovi nauke i metafizike].