Naturalism and the Metasemantic Account of Concepts

In chapter 5 of his 1992 book A Study of Concepts, Christopher Peacocke claims that his account ofconcepts can be reconciled with naturalism. Nonetheless, despite Peacocke's greatest efforts toconvince the skeptics that the mentioned accommodation is viable if one accepts his approach toconcepts, some suspicion survives. In a recent paper on this very topic, Jose Luis Bermudez raisesquestions about Peacocke's supposed naturalization by arguing that the approach in question is notable to make sense of the distinction between misapplying a concept one nonetheless possesses andnot possessing that concept at all. What I am going to do here is, on the one hand, defendPeacocke's concept naturalization project from Bermudez's objection and, on the other hand, showthat the latter's suggestion cannot save the surely crucial distinction between making a mistake inusing a concept and being incapable of a mistake or a correct use because of not having theconcept.