The Ontological Proof, the Option, and the Unique Necessaire: Maurice Blondel's Examination of the Proof in Anselm, Descartes, and Malebranche

Maurice Blondel makes reference to and use of the ontological argument both in his early L'action (1893) and his later metaphysical Trilogy. This paper examines Blondel's interpretation of the argument as a central part of his philosophy and Blondel's discussions of the argument in his interpretation of Anselm, Descartes, and Malebranche. The first part of the paper discusses Blondel's reinterpretation of the argument in L'action (1893) and the second part discusses his further reinterpretation in La Pensée. The third part discusses Blondel's interpretation of the ontological argument in Anselm, Descartes, and Malebranche in relation to broader themes motivating their work, which he discusses in articles in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale and the Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica. I argue that Blondel gives Descartes a priority over Anselm, and Malebranche over Descartes. In the fourth part, I argue that the priority Blondel assigns to Descartes over Anselm ought to be minimized, and discuss two similarities between Blondel's position and Anselm's position.