Collision model-based algebraic side-channel attack on LED
基于碰撞模型的LED代数旁路攻击

This paper proposed a collision model-based algebraic side-channel attack on lightweight block cipher LED. Firstly, it described the algebraic representations of LED. Secondly, it measured the power leakages of LED on ATMEGA324P microcontroller by a digital oscilloscope, and transformed to deduce collision. Finally, the collision was expressed as algebraic equations, and it applied the CryptoMiniSAT solver to solve for the key. Experiments demonstrate that the collision of side-channel information can introduce new algebraic equations into attack, reduce the complexity of solving equations; in the known-plaintext scenario, 2 rounds collision information is enough to recover the 64 bit LED master key in 158. 5 s. The proposed method can be applied into the collision-based power attack of other block ciphers.