The standard design of cross-border watershed eco-compensation based on water quality agreement between upstream and downstream
基于水质协议的跨界流域生态补偿标准研究

This paper analyzed mechanism of cross-border watershed eco-compensation policy and discussed the problem of the policy's time consistency with complete information. Under the framework of Stackelberg Game, the results showed that the policy was time consistency when the form of water eco-compensation standard and the environmental damage function were linear. The time consistency can be attributed either to the association of the eco-compensation standard to the cost of environmental damage or directly to the pollutant reduction cost of all regions in the watershed. After analyzing the time consistency of the policy, this paper used the Jialuhe watershed in Henan province as a case to simulate the cross-border eco-compensation policy. The results revealed that the policy goal could be achieved when the eco-compensation standard set as 2714.13 Yuan·t-1. In this condition, the amount of COD emissions among the regions involved satisfied the total emission control target of the watershed. Comparing the cross-border watershed eco-compensation policy with the policy of the mandatory pollutant emission control, the cost of COD reduction between regions involved decreased. The policy implication of this research was that at this stage, cross-border watershed eco-compensation is an effective environmental economic policy in China.