An Economic Model of Official Crime based on Life Cycle Hypothesis
基于生命周期假说的职务犯罪经济学模型

The dynamic characteristic of official crime is analyzed by an economic model based on life cycle hypothesis.The model mainly considers the following relevant factors: the risk of being caught and the associated punishment,legislation,work and retirement wage,and retirement age and life expectancy.The individual is assumed to be risk neutral.His decision variable is illegal income. The individual's objective is to maximize the expected utility subjected to a dynamic constraint.We obtain the explicit expressions for the optimal strategy and the corresponding utility.The main results are as follows: Under certain conditions,it is rational for the individual to get income illegally before retirement,and a higher punishment is not necessarily an effective way to deter official crime;The higher the income difference before and after retirement is,the higher the probability of official crime is;To reduce the retirement age will probably increase official crime;The more resource the individual controls,the later the official crime should begin;The income pattern that work wage increases with the increase of work year is helpful to reduce official crime;The effect of income level on official crime reflects some kind of "level effect" and "asymmetry".