Game Analysis on Control Modes in Emission Declaration
排污申报控制方式的博弈分析

This paper explores two control modes of emission declaration based on the dynamic game behavior between the regulator and the firms with asymmetry information of emission quantity.In practice,the regulator always allocates the emission permits to some extent in proportion to the emission quantity that the firms declare in China.However the firms always do not believe the regulator,for the policy is not dynamic consistent sometimes.On the other hand,there are two control modes to be chosen for the regulator,one of which is to control the total quantity of the emission that should be cut,and the other is to control the total quantity of the emission.We therefore develop a model based on Stackelberg dynamic model to analyze and compare the game behavior between the regulator and the firms under the two modes.We find that when the regulator is honest,the former isn't dynamic consistent in general while the latter is dynamic consistent.So the latter is better than the former in concern with dynamic consistency.