Analysis on the Credit Risk Decision Contract against Moral Risk
规避道德风险的信贷风险决策合同模型分析

The paper mainly studies the method against moral risk under the two different cases of both risk type pooling and risk type non-pooling in the credit market. It analyses two different characteristics on the default about the moral risk applicants before contracting and after contracting. It shows that, under the appearing risk type pool, if the bank does not adopt incentive compatibility mechanism, it will select a contract harming himself. But if the bank adopts incentive compatibility mechanism, it can resist the moral risk. In additional, the paper still introduces collateral rate as an important index scaling the moral risk. The results show that, the collateral rate is larger, the ability of resisting the moral risk is weaker.Contrarily, the collateral rate is smaller, the ability of resisting the moral risk is stronger.By using the model,the paper also proves that enough collateral can reduce the moral risk and non-enough collateral will be likely to lead the moral risk.