Hacia una filosofía práctica de la ciencia: Especie biológica y deliberación ética

in the last few decades the philosophy of science has open its view to practical matters. fortunately, it has recovered the dialogue with social, moral and political thought. we have a significant example of this phenomenon in the present debate on the concept of species. this is a key concept in biology. let's remember that it appears in the title of the more determinant book of contemporary biology, the origin of species by charles darwin. is a common research topic, therefore, for philosophers of science. on the other hand, this concept is becoming present at the very centre of ethical deliberation. for example, we often approach the preservation of biodiversity as a moral and political issue. here the notion of species is, obviously, a centrepiece. this is also true with regard to our relations with other living beings, a problem that is embodied in more specific discussions and even daily, as the debates on the alleged rights of animals, on the vegetarianism, on the bullfighting, on animal testing... frequently it is alleged that our treatment to others living beings, or to other sentient beings, should not to be conditioned by the species to which they belong -speciesism is wrong, it is said. this stance, by the way, puts into question, the dignity and nature of human being. let's appreciate therefore the deep and current consequences of these discussions, the significance of today's deliberation on the notion of species, as well as the relevance of a fair cooperation between moral philosophers and philosophers of science. to contribute to this dialogue, i propose, first, to extend slightly the characterization of philosophy of science as a practical philosophy, as well as a necessary partner in ethical deliberation (section 1). secondly, i will present the state of affairs regarding the current debate on the concept of species (section 2). thirdly, we will see the importance that this concept has gained in practical contexts, such in the paradigmatic case of