La racionalidad limitada de los agentes contaminadores y sus efectos sobre la eficiencia económica en el control de vertimientos: el caso de las tasas retributivas

introduction. this paper analyzes the efficiency of the retributive rates as an instrument to control discharges. objective. to determine if the actions performed by pollutant companies as responses to the retributive rates follow a rational strategy to minimize the costs of the activities that produce contamination. materials and methods. a questionnaire was applied to the workers from the environmental management departments of the companies that produce discharges, in order to have their perceptions concerning the retributive rates and find out what actions they have taken as a response to the collection of the rate. a probit regression was estimated to establish the circumstances that led to those actions. results. the companies that self-declare their discharges and simultaneously receive the retributive rates as a sanction and not as a tax to pollution, are the ones with the highest possibility of performing actions to control their discharges. conclusion. the limited rationality prevents retributive rates to boost a behavior characterized by the socially optimal contamination control.