Poder de decreto e accountability horizontal: dinamica institucional dos três poderes e medidas provisórias no Brasil pós-1988

this article articulates studies on the relationship between executive and legislative powers with bibliography on what has been called the "judicialization of politics" in order to promote a better understanding of how horizontal accountability unfolds with specific regard to the issue of the brazilian president's power to decree bills within the current context of democracy. for these purposes, we present a brief overview of recent bibliography in brazilian political science on the role of "medidas provisórias" ("temporary acts") holding it up against the light of quantitative and qualititative analysis of observed phenomena. we conclude in agreement with the thesis that these measures enable executive control over the political agenda in which the supreme court and the congress tend not to interfere. the changes introduced through the promulgation of constitutional amendment n. 32/2001 allows us to note, contrary to what it would be possible to assume, the continuity that characterized this scenario, rather than greater controls over presidential legislating activities. this can be explained by looking at the dynamics of the three state powers during the period that precedes 2001, in which the parameters that were incorporated into the constitution through the above-mentioned amendment were taking shape. furthermore, the data collected support our argument on the diminishing control over executive decrees, particularly with regard to supreme court concession of injunctions which was reduced after the amendment's promulgation.