Crítica a los reduccionismos epistemológicos en las ciencias sociales

this paper aims to criticize the epistemological reductionisms in the social sciences, among which are: geocentric reductionism, geographic, economic, linguistic, logical analysis, structural-functionalist, hermeneutic, phenomenological and emergent reductionism. in contrast to these reductionisms, there are several approaches that have emerged in the history of human thought, that with different terms, have been trying to overcome these reductionist points of view, such as: the dialectical paradigm, the holistic, the complexity and the postcolonial paradigms. as final thoughts, the paper highlights that there have always been and there will always be epistemic grounds to conceive -both unilaterally and multilaterally- reality; and the fact that one or another perspective prevails will depend on the level of development of science and philosophy ( the greater or lesser recognition that the protagonist of some sciences has, in particular, given their social and technological impact), as well as on the degree of development and solution for social contradictions of the historical epoch in which reductionisms are generated and dissolved.