Disaster Response Operations Incident Command Systems in Mombasa County, Kenya

Most of the previous disaster response by first responders shows the insignificant existence of a management structure that syntheses complex disaster scenarios and response under exceptional circumstances as a unitary system. Cases of Delay in response to emergencies resulting in death and uncoordinated response are prevalent among response organizations due to minimal use of Incident Command System. Globally, the U.S. response organization’s ability to provide effective and coordinated responses to complex incidents came under intense scrutiny in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the dissemination of anthrax in 2001. Regionally, the response to the Ebola virus outbreak in Sierra Leone overwhelmed the national capacity to contain it necessitating a massive international response. The inapplicability of the Incident Command System contributed to the duplication of efforts between the coordination groups, and slow resource mobilization. At a national level, the 2002 Mombasa attack was a two-pronged terrorist attack on 28 November 2002 in Mombasa, Kenya against an Israeli-owned hotel and a plane belonging to Arkia Airlines. An all-terrain vehicle crashed through a barrier outside the Paradise Hotel and blew up, killing 13 and injuring 80. At the same time, attackers fired two surface-to-air missiles at an Israeli charter plane. The Paradise Hotel was the only Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa. The Paradise Hotel terror attack in 2002 in Mombasa and the Westgate terror attack in 2013 in Nairobi showed operation decay. The Westgate terror attack siege lasted 80 hours and resulted in at least 67 deaths and more than 175 people wounded in the mass shooting. A fatal friendly fire incident between security forces undermined the response and left the attackers free to prolong their slaughter. This research, therefore, sought to examine the structure of Mombasa County Incident Command System of a few selected organizations influencing disaster response operations. Contingency theory and goal theory guided the study. A descriptive research design was used. A stratified sampling technique was used to determine the sample category of 155 respondents from, the Red Cross Society, Kenya Police Service, Mombasa Fire Brigade, and National Youth Service. The instruments of data collection were structured questionnaires. SPSS version 27 was used to analyze data and then presented it on tables and graphs. Test validity refers to the degree to which the test actually measures what it claims to measure. Test validity is also the extent to which inferences, conclusions, and decisions made on the basis of test scores are appropriate and meaningful. Validity was determined using content validity while reliability using a retest process. Results indicated that differences in organizations’ Incident Command System affected effective response to disaster operations. Also, lack of cooperation by multiagency, waste and duplication of resources, and difficulty in coordinating response activities were the challenges identified that an organization face while responding to large disasters in the absence of the Incident Command System. The study recommends that response agencies should embrace fostering cooperation during joint operations to avoid waste of resources and duplication of roles and difficulty in coordinating response activities through the use of the Incident Command System.