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Contact Dilemma: The Malady of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Troops

DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1102929, PP. 1-9

Subject Areas: Military Science

Keywords: Militia, Contact Dilemma, Al Shabaab, Peace Support Operations, Intervention, Contact, Engagements

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The collapse of Somali Government in the early 1990s left the state in the hands of predatory war lords who wrecked the country into havoc. The country has remained in a state of violent conflict for nearly over two decades. Intervention of United Nations Operations in Somalia failed to meet its objectives leaving the vulnerable population at the mercy of warlords when it finally withdrew its troops from the war torn nation. Despite the efforts of AMISOM troops to degrade the capability of Al Shabaab, little has been achieved. The militant group seems to be attacking the troops with vigour and renewed strength. With new barbaric counterinsurgency tactics, the terror group is regaining holds in the previously liberated regions. The soldiers tend to flee when they get engagements with Al Shabaab. They are unable to hold and suppress the firepower during contact. Consequently, the soldiers go into a flight mode turning their defensive position into a rout. This act is proving to be catastrophic to the mission since it occasions fatalities to the troops. Some who miss in action get lost into the hostile enemy territory. It is in this context that the study reports ways in which this malady can be curbed through the lens of contact dilemma.

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Ligawa, W. O. , Standslause, O. E. O. and Rahoy, M. H. (2016). Contact Dilemma: The Malady of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Troops. Open Access Library Journal, 3, e2929. doi:


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