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The Impact of Directors with Foreign Experience on Executive Compensation: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

DOI: 10.4236/ojbm.2017.54055, PP. 653-670

Keywords: Directors, Foreign Experience, Executive Compensation

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Abstract:

We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on executive Compensation. Using a data set from Chinese listed companies, we find out that executive compensation tends to be higher in companies with directors that have foreign experience. To evaluate this change in executive compensation, we further explore the impact of director with oversea background on pay performance link in these companies, which is an indicator of corporate governance and compensation management. Result shows that the impact of directors with foreign experience depends on the equity nature of the company.

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