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Strategic Interaction and Charitable Fundraising

DOI: 10.4236/me.2012.33044, PP. 338-345

Keywords: Non-profit, Charities, Strategic Interaction

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Abstract:

This paper studies strategic interaction between rival charities providing multiple public goods, highlighting the role of fundraising campaigns in influencing donor decision-making. The analysis suggests that, even when charities honor donor designation, social welfare may be higher in equilibrium when charities solicit donors sequentially, rather than simultaneously or through a United Fund.

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