“知道怎么做”和“知道那个事实”
“Knowing How” and “Knowing That”

吉尔伯特·赖尔在《心的概念》第二章中提出的“知道怎么做”和“知道那个事实”之间的区别，是本文的出发点。这种区分简单且看似显而易见，因而颇具吸引力。但像任意一个二分法一样，它也引发了诸多争议和困惑。比如，哈特兰德·斯旺反而认为“知道那个事实”可以归结为“知道怎么做”。本文试图指出，在有限的范围内，这样的说法可以成立。此外，一旦“知道那个事实”被归结为“知道怎么做”，就必须在“知道怎么做”中涵盖的两种倾向之间做出区分。本文的第一部分致力于厘清赖尔及哈特兰德·斯旺使用这两个短语时所指涉的倾向类型；第二部分将讨论一旦承认哈特兰德·斯旺的还原论，就必须进一步做出新的区分。最后，本文将考察一些既未被赖尔也未被哈特兰德·斯旺考虑过的“知道怎么做”和“知道那个事实”类型的表述，并且进一步探讨它们所指称的倾向是否能归入哈特兰德·斯旺的“知道怎么做”之中。
The distinction between “knowing how” and “knowing that” proposed by Gilbert Ryle in Chapter Two of “The Concept of Mind” serves as the starting point of this paper. This distinction is simple and seemingly obvious, thus quite appealing. However, like any dichotomy, it has also sparked numerous controversies and confusions. For instance, Hartland Swann contends that “knowing that” can be reduced to “knowing how”. This paper aims to demonstrate that within a limited scope, such a claim can hold true. Moreover, once “knowing that” is reduced to “knowing how”, it becomes necessary to distinguish between the two tendencies encompassed within “knowing how”. The first part of this paper endeavors to clarify the types of tendencies referred to by Ryle and Hartland Swann when using these two phrases; the second part will discuss the new distinctions that must be made if Hartland Swann’s reductionism is acknowledged. Finally, this paper will examine some expressions of “knowing how” and “knowing that” that have not been considered by either Ryle or Hartland Swann, and further explore whether the tendencies they refer to can be subsumed under Hartland Swann’s “knowing how”.