论霍耐特对物化理论规范基础的重构
On Honneth’s Reconstruction of the Normative Foundation of Reification Theory

自从哈贝马斯反思了批判理论的规范基础问题，任何新的批判理论就必须自觉地为自己的规范基础进行辩护；因而为了重构卢卡奇的物化理论，霍耐特首先就要重构其规范基础。通过对卢卡奇文本的分析，霍耐特将卢卡奇的物化批判基础确定为人类学意义上的人类本真实践状态，但这种分析却又与卢卡奇文本中的历史哲学路径有所冲突。霍耐特曾梳理过社会哲学的人类学路径与历史哲学路径，并鲜明地表现出对人类学路径的偏好和对历史哲学路径的排斥；在这一更大的思想背景中，霍耐特保留了卢卡奇思想中的人类学要素而舍弃掉了历史哲学路径。霍耐特从卢卡奇的人类学描述出发，通过引述海德格尔、杜威等人的思想，将物化批判的规范基础重构为社会存在论意义上的“承认”。对于“承认”概念所预设的社会存在论性质，霍耐特提供了三重论证：理论史的分析、个体发生学的证明和概念范畴的证明。通过这一系列复杂的步骤，霍耐特便完成了以“承认”概念对卢卡奇物化规范基础的重构，这为其进一步重构物化理论打下了坚实的基础。
Since Habermas reflected on the normative foundation of critical theory, any new critical theory must consciously defend its normative basis; therefore, in order to reconstruct Lukacs’ reification theory, Honneth must first reconstruct its normative foundation. Through the analysis of Lukacs’ text, Honneth defined Lukacs’ normative foundation of criticism as the true practice state of human beings in the anthropological sense, but this analysis conflicts with the path of historical philosophy in Lukacs’ text. Honneth once combed the anthropological path and historical philosophy path of so-cial philosophy, and clearly showed his preference for anthropological path and his rejection of his-torical philosophy path. In this larger ideological background, Honneth kept the anthropological elements in Lukacs’ thought and abandoned the path of historical philosophy. Based on Lukacs’ anthropological description, Honneth reconstructed the normative of reification criticism into “recognition” in the sense of social ontology by quoting Heidegger and Dewey. For the social existential nature presupposed by the concept of “recognition”, Honneth provided three arguments: the analysis of theoretical history, the proof of ontogeny and the proof of concept category. Through this series of complicated steps, Honneth completed the reconstruction of Lukacs’ normative foundation of reification with the concept of “recognition”, which laid a solid foundation for his further reconstruction of reification theory.