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基于声誉的条件惩罚对合作演化的影响——考虑种群效应
The Impact of Reputation Based Conditional Punishment on Cooperative Evolution—Considering Population Effects

DOI: 10.12677/SA.2023.124104, PP. 1009-1019

Keywords: 合作,声誉,条件惩罚
Cooperation
, Reputation, Conditional Punishment

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Abstract:

达尔文主义的自然选择学说认为适者生存是生物演化的基本准则,即个体之间存在着竞争关系,适应度高的个体能够在竞争中存活并繁衍,但是如今自然界和人类社会的现象表明在如此激烈的环境中物种之间却存在着普遍合作的现象。然而,现有基于演化博弈论对合作现象的出现及维持的研究,还不能系统全面地解释在复杂博弈过程中的演化动力学过程,因此需进一步讨论合作是如何演化的。基于此,我们对基于声誉的条件惩罚行为进行建模,在本模型中,个体是否会受到惩罚主要是以自己的声誉与邻居平均声誉作比较来进行判定,从而探究考虑种群效应在内的合作行为的演化。结果表明,当个体声誉与邻居平均声誉相较而言更高时,越有利于促进和维护合作。此外,我们还发现增加惩罚强度可以有效地促进合作行为的发生。
Darwinism’s Natural selection theory believes that Survival of the fittest is the basic principle of biological evolution, that is, a competitive relationship between individuals, individuals with high adaptability can survive and reproduce in the competition. Today’s various phenomena in nature and human society show that there is universal cooperation between species in such a fierce environment. However, the existing research on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation based on evolutionary Game theory cannot systematically and comprehensively explain the evolutionary dynamic process in the complex game process, so it is necessary to further discuss how cooperation evolves. Based on this, we model reputation-based conditional punishment behavior. In this model, whether an individual will be punished is mainly determined by comparing their own reputation with the average reputation of their neighbors, in order to explore the evolution of cooperative behavior considering population effects. The results indicate that when the individual reputation is higher compared to the average reputation of neighbors, it is more conducive to promoting and maintaining cooperation. In addition, we also found that increasing the intensity of punishment can effectively promote the occurrence of cooperative behavior.

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