医养结合模式下的医疗与养老机构合作策略分析——基于博弈论与激励相容理论
Analysis on Cooperation Strategy of Medical and Pension Institutions under the Mode of Combination of Medical and Nursing Care—Based on Game Theory and Incentive Compatibility Theory

随着全球人口老龄化的加剧，医养结合模式已成为一种重要的养老服务模式，它将医疗与养老资源有机结合，以更好满足老年人健康需求，并实现养老服务的持续改善。但是现存发展中仍旧存在一些问题，所以文章通过分析医疗机构和养老机构的合作行为，以博弈理论为基础，构建医疗卫生机构和养老机构的博弈模型。分析双方在博弈过程中的最佳策略选择，针对存在的问题并结合激励相容理论来提出相应的政策建议：完善相关政策支持、拓宽筹资渠道、推动人才队伍建设、完善机构设施、探索长期护理保险等，促进医养结合的长期发展，对我国的养老服务提供一定的帮助。
With the increasing aging of the global population, the combination of medical care and old-age care has become an important old-age service model, which organically combines medical care and old-age care resources to better meet the health needs of the elderly and realize the continuous improvement of old-age care services. However, there are still some problems in the existing development, so this paper, by analyzing the cooperative behavior of medical institutions and pension institutions, builds the game model of medical and health institutions and pension institutions based on the game theory. This paper analyzes the best strategy choice of both sides in the game process, and puts forward corresponding policy suggestions based on the existing problems and the incentive compatibility theory: improve the relevant policy support, widen the financing channels, promote the construction of talent team, improve institutions and facilities, explore long-term care insurance, etc., promote the long-term development of the combination of medical care, and provide some help to the old-age service in our country.