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问询函监管对信息披露质量的影响研究
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Abstract:
信息披露质量是上市公司质量的重要因素,沪深交易所近年逐步建立了以信息披露为主的监管理念和以问询函为主要手段的资本市场监管模式。本文基于全国A股市场2014~2020年的年报问询监管函数据,采用KV度量法衡量信息披露质量,运用双固定效应模型考察问询函监管对信息披露质量的影响。研究发现,问询函监管可以显著提升上市公司的信息披露质量。异质性检验发现,相较于国有企业,问询函监管对非国有企业信息披露质量的提升更显著;相较于两职分离的企业,问询函监管对两职合一企业的信息披露质量存在更强的提升作用。根据研究结果,本文提出建议如下:证券交易所应不断完善问询函监管机制,重视以问询函为主的非处罚性监管制度,及时发函要求上市公司纠正年报披露中存在的问题;上市公司要以身作则及时回复问询函,不断提高信息披露质量,健全财务体系制度,为市场提供高质量的信息。
The quality of information disclosure is an important factor affecting the quality of listed companies. In recent years, Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange has gradually established the supervision concept based on information disclosure and the capital market supervision mode based on inquiry letter. Based on the annual report inquiry supervision letter data of the national A-share market from 2014 to 2020, this paper uses the KV measurement method to measure the quality of infor-mation disclosure, and uses the double fixed effect model to investigate the impact of inquiry su-pervision on the quality of information disclosure. The study found that inquiry letter regulation can significantly improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. The heterogene-ity test found that compared with state-owned enterprises, inquiry letter supervision improved the quality of information disclosure of non-state-owned enterprises more significantly; compared with enterprises with two separate positions, inquiry letter supervision plays a stronger role in improv-ing the quality of information disclosure of two in one enterprises. According to the research results, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: stock exchanges should constantly improve the supervision mechanism of inquiry letters, pay attention to the non punitive supervision system based on inquiry letters, and send letters in time to require listed companies to correct the prob-lems existing in the disclosure of annual reports; listed companies should set an example, respond to inquiry letters in time, constantly improve the quality of information disclosure, improve the fi-nancial system and provide high-quality information for the market.
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