公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理
Corporate Governance, Directors &Officers Liability Insurance and Earnings Management

董事高管责任保险在董事和高管遭受民事诉讼时具有“兜底”效应，降低了董事高管的执业风险。选取2002-2014年中国A股上市公司为样本，实证检验董事高管责任保险对公司盈余管理的影响，进一步分析在不同公司治理水平下，董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的关系是否存在差异。研究结果表明：董事高管责任保险的引入会加剧公司盈余管理行为；随着公司治理水平提高，董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的正相关关系减弱。
Directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) will exert a "fallback" effect for the directors and executives in civil litigation, reduce the risk of the executive director. We choose 2002-2014 China A-share listed companies as samples to investigate the relationship between D&O insurance and earnings management and further analyze the relationship between earnings management. The results show that the D&O insurance will aggravate the introduction of earnings management behavior; at the different corporate governance level, it can weaken the positive correlation between earnings management and D&O insurance.