考虑服务溢出与竞争效应的O2O渠道合作机制研究
Research on cooperative scheme for O2O channels in the presence of service spillover and competition effects

在零售商线下渠道服务对制造商线上需求产生的溢出效应使得服务不能完全转化为线下需求基础上，研究O2O线上与线下渠道合作机制的设计问题。通过构建分散式决策情形下制造商和零售商的主从博弈模型，分析了服务溢出效应、渠道间价格竞争程度对最优决策的影响，探究了服务溢出效应对价格竞争的调节机理。以集中式决策为基准，设计了一种基于需求引导的O2O线上与线下渠道合作机制。研究发现，服务溢出效应并不总会抑制零售商提供服务的积极性。同时，服务溢出效应具有调节价格竞争的作用。合作机制下，供应链系统能够实现利润最大化，并且，该机制具有柔性，能够通过对系统利润的任意分配实现成员的帕累托改进。最后通过数值分析，验证了该机制的有效性。
In order to compete with the manufacturer, the retailer is beginning to take advantage of his offline channel to provide service for customers so as to promote demand. However, the service in the offline channel also has a spillover effect on the demand of manufacturer's online channel. This in turn makes the retailer lose the would-be demand. Under such situation, this paper investigates a cooperative scheme design issue for O2O namely online and offline channels. In order to solve this issue, a Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer under the decentralized setting is built. Then, the impacts of service spillover effect and price competition degree between channels on optimal solutions are analyzed. On the basis of the centralized setting, a cooperative scheme for online and offline channels based on demand inducing is put forward. The results show that the retailer's enthusiasm for providing service will not always be inhibited. Moreover, the spillover effect can adjust the price competition according to the market share. Under the cooperative scheme, system-wide optimization can be achieved and supply chain members' Pareto improvements can be realized via arbitrary allocation of the system profit. Finally, the effectiveness of the cooperative scheme is verified through numerical examples.