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- 2018
单边不完全信息重复博弈中的Cav(u)定理的推广
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Abstract:
摘要： 利用Wasserstein距离的性质,将单边不完全信息重复博弈中的Cav(u)定理从凸紧子集的情形推广到整个多维空间的情形。
Abstract: Based on the properties of Wasserstein distance, we generalize the Cav(u)theorem for repeated games with incomplete information on one side from convex and compact subset to the whole space
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