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考虑广告主信誉的付费搜索拍卖机制研究——均衡、收益与效率分析

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Keywords: 付费搜索拍卖,GSP机制,VCG均衡,拍卖效率

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Abstract:

?搜索关键字拍卖机制的逐利本质诱发了大量的虚假广告,引发了公众的广泛争议,信誉已成为搜索媒体改进其拍卖机制必须考虑的关键因素之一。通过在关键字GSP拍卖模型中引入广告主信誉因素,提出了一种可信竞价排名的GSP拍卖机制,与传统拍卖机制相比,能有效提高中标广告主的信誉水平,通过对广告主均衡竞价策略、均衡收益与效率的分析表明,在广告主信誉差别较大时,该机制在增进搜索引擎收益和拍卖效率方面也有一定的优势;最后通过研究均衡的实现路径和模拟实验,在不完全信息动态环境下也验证了这一结论。

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