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基于经济机制设计理论的电力市场竞争机制设计

DOI: 10.13334/j.0258-8013.pcsee.2014.10.024, PP. 1709-1716

Keywords: 电力市场,经济机制设计,信息有效,激励相容

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Abstract:

考虑到信息有效性对于激励型电力市场的重要性和现实意义,提出一种可以设计出具有激励相容且兼顾信息有效性的电力市场机制的算法。基于经济机制设计原理,构建了一个多发电商的发电侧竞争性电力市场机制模型,研究了该机制的特性,并通过IEEE-9标准节点系统的仿真对其有效性进行验证。仿真结果表明,该机制在整个电力市场的资源分配达到帕累托最优的同时,允许发电商追求自身利润的极大化,能够满足观测有效性、沟通有效性和低信息计算复杂性的要求,保护发电商的私人信息安全,并鼓励各个发电商之间展开良性的竞争。因此,依据该算法可以设计出一个激励相容、信息有效并且分散决策的电力市场机制。

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