Interpretation of formal proof for Cryptographic Protocols into Computational Model

Cryptography is the spinal cord for all security measures involved in computing field so a lot of emphasis is required to be given to make it strong enough to deal all the transition of the security industry. We present a general method to prove security properties of multiple cryptographic protocols in an execution model where clients exchange messages using multiple protocols against active adversaries. The method discussed here allows to interpret the logical formal proofs of cryptographic systems into their computational equivalent. The security properties are expressed in terms of logics, which are then interpreted in a computational setup. Also, we further show that if the statement is true for any symbolic execution then the corresponding computational interpretation is widely accepted in all forms. The messages between clients are expressed in syntax form and do not require dealing with asymptotic notations and probability distribution. This paper provides a basic framework and edifice for extending the protocol specification language with other cryptographic primitives.