Stakeholder Interests during Development of Water Scenery Resources and Regulation Implications
水利风景资源开发的利益博弈及规制机制

The government supervises tourism projects to facilitate the protection and rational utilization of water scenery resources,but excessive and unordered development of water scenery resources remains common. To determine whether tourism project supervision and government regulation are valid,stakeholder interests during development need to be understood. Game theory provides a useful method for this. Here,we analyze stakeholder revenue,losses and costs during the development of water scenery resources,while considering the degree of supervision as an independent variable. We construct a cost-revenue model of stakeholders,and determine the optimal supervision degree and effective supervision interval. The model indicates that balanced supervision is a dynamic process related to stakeholder interest and gambling. Five types of government supervision were classified according to dynamic changes in balanced supervision, and three kinds of game playing relationships exist between tourism entrepreneurs and government, tourism entrepreneurs and local people,and superior and local water administrators. Gambling model analysis revealed that Chinese water resource management faces difficulties with project supervision,and negative externalities during development require government supervision. Increasing the penalties for environmental damage,paying greater attention to supervision and enhancing punishments can reduce illegal activity. As a consequence,the adjustment or redistribution of stakeholder interests is needed to resolve problems around water scenery development. An interactive interest-based regulation mechanism founded in law is needed to achieve balance between resources environmental responsibilities and interests.