Analysis of the Effects of Pricing Power on the Selection of Cooperation Strategies
定价决策权威对合作策略选择的影响分析

Aiming at the supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in a determinative market,this paper studies the conditions of cooperation between firms with symmetrical cost information.We show that in the process of bargaining game on the joint profit,no matter which firm acts firstly,if its pricing power locates within the scope determined by their bargaining cost coefficients,the rational manufacturer and the retailer will choose to cooperate fully and share the joint profits according to the bargaining outcome,realizing two-winning,and furthermore,we check the alteration of this scope with the change of bargaining cost coefficients;Otherwise,if its pricing power locates beyond this scope,either one firm will choose to cooperate fully and the other will choose to cooperate partly or both of them will choose to cooperate partly.