Licensing Strategies in a Differentiated Cournot Oligopoly
异质产品Cournot寡头竞争企业替代技术许可竞争策略分析

This paper analyzes the licensing strategies of patent-holding firms with cost-reducing innovation protected by a patent proprietary in a differentiated Cournot oligopoly market where two of firms has cost-reducing substitute innovation protected by a patent proprietary.It shows that,under fixed-fee licensing,both patent-holding firms is always willing to license its non-drastic innovation to the incumbent inferior firms,and the number of licenses by each patent-holding firm increases with the number of inferior firms and the degree of product differentiation,in particular,the number of licenses by each patent-holding is two or more two when the number of the incumbent inferior firms is not less than 5.Furthermore,it is found that the patent-holding firms willing to licensing its drastic innovation to more incumbent inferior firms,but the substitute patent-holding firms have incentives to collude in order to reduce or stop licensing.